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The health care professions in Europe have been subject to substantial entry and
conduct regulation. Most notably, pharmacies have frequently received high regulated
markups over wholesale costs, and have been protected from additional competition
through geographic entry restrictions. We develop an entry model to study the direct
impact of the regulations on the pharmacies, and the indirect impact on the physicians
who provide related services. We study the case of Belgium, which is representative
for many other countries with geographic entry restrictions. We ￿nd that the entry
decisions of pharmacies and physicians are strategic complements. Furthermore, the
entry restrictions have directly reduced the number of pharmacies by more than 50%,
and indirectly reduced the number of physicians by about 7%. A policy analysis shows
that a removal of the entry restrictions, combined with a large reduction in the regu-
lated markups (by between 10￿ 18%, down from the current 28%) would lead to a large
shift in rent to consumers, without reducing the geographic coverage of pharmacies
throughout the country. These ￿ndings show that the public interest motivation for
the current regime has no empirical support. Our ￿ndings are also relevant in light of
the renewed attention by competition authorities to liberalize professional regulation.
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Professional or occupational regulation has been a widespread phenomenon in many coun-
tries. It consists of a variety of measures a⁄ecting entry (such as minimum standards of
competency and territorial entry restrictions) and additional measures stipulating conduct
(e.g. price and advertising). According to Kleiner (2000), professional regulation has been
one area where the impact on the labor markets has been stronger in the U.S. than in Eu-
rope. Its impact on competition in the product markets, however, appears to have been
more important in Europe in recent years. The U.S. courts started to consistently apply
their antitrust laws to professional services after a Supreme Court Decision in 1975. In con-
trast, the European countries continued to be tolerant towards the anti-competitive e⁄ects
of professional regulation (Wise (2000)). Only very recently, the European Commission has
shown an interest in making the practices more in line with competition policy rules.1 The
economic debate on the desirability of professional regulation is still ongoing. Proponents
have emphasized the presence of various kinds of market failures, but critical assessors have
pointed out that many of the regulations essentially serve to protect the professions￿private
interests. In general, it is becoming clear that the e⁄ects of professional regulation should
be examined on a case by case basis.
The health care professions in Europe provide an interesting and economically important
case. Physicians and pharmacies supply essential services to patients, and their activities
have been heavily regulated. Both professions need to satisfy minimum educational stan-
dards and are subject to strict conduct regulation, with regulated fees and bans on most
types of advertising. In addition, the number of pharmacies is restricted on a geographic
basis in many countries (a notable exception being Germany). These regulations have been
commonly motivated to be in the public interest because of many obvious market failures in
the provision of health care services. In particular, the high ￿xed markups to pharmacies and
their geographic entry restrictions have been argued to be necessary to ensure a minimum
availability of supply in the less pro￿table regions, without inducing excessive entry else-
where. The private interest view challenges these motivations, arguing that the regulations
are anti-competitive and have no bene￿cial e⁄ects to other parties. In a detailed report, the
U.K.￿ s O¢ ce of Fair Trading (2003) concluded that free entry by pharmacies in the U.K.
would bene￿t consumers. The O.E.C.D. (2000) obtained similar conclusions based on the
experiences in a larger set of countries, but also emphasized that a holistic view be taken. For
1This interest is evident from the extensive report describing the state of professional regulation in Europe,
written by Paterson, Fink and Ogus (2003) for the European Commission. This report subsequently lead
to an o¢ cial Communication, COM (2004) 83, showing the Commission￿ s commitment to liberalize the
professions.
1example, simply introducing free entry to pharmacies without any accompanying measures
would likely create excessive entry because of the currently high regulated markups.
In this paper, we aim to shed new light on the role of professional regulation in the
health care professions. We develop an econometric model of entry by two types of pro-
fessions: pharmacies and physicians (de￿ned as general practitioners). Extending previous
entry models of Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), Mazzeo (2002) and others, the model accounts
for two key features that are speci￿c to this market. First, entry is not free but geographic
entry restrictions apply to one of the professions, i.e. pharmacies. Second, both professions
are strategically interdependent: their entry decisions may be either strategic complements
or strategic substitutes. The entry model can be used to draw inferences about competitive
interaction, both within and between the professions. In addition, it allows us to assess to
which extent the entry restrictions have limited the number of ￿rms, either directly (phar-
macies) or indirectly (physicians). This makes it possible to shed light on the public interest
view that motivates the current regulatory regime.
We apply the model to a data set for Belgium, which is representative for many other
countries with geographic entry restrictions. The data contain information on the number
of pharmacies and physicians per market (town), and the corresponding demographic char-
acteristics in 2001. Regarding competitive interaction, we ￿nd that entry into one profession
has a positive e⁄ect on the pro￿tability of entry into the other profession, i.e. the entry
decisions by ￿rms of di⁄erent professions are strategic complements. Furthermore, entry
does not lead to intensi￿ed (non-price) competition among ￿rms of the same profession.
Regarding the geographic entry restrictions, we ￿nd that they have substantially limited the
number of ￿rms. A simple removal of all geographic entry restrictions without any accom-
panying measures would more than double the number of pharmacies, and also indirectly
increase the number of physicians by about 7% (due to the strategic complementarities).
If a full removal of the entry restrictions would be combined with an absolute reduction in
the pharmacies￿regulated gross markups by between 10￿ 18% (down from the current 28%),
the total number of pharmacies in the country would remain constant and the local geo-
graphic coverage (i.e. the number of markets with at least one pharmacy) would essentially
remain the same. In sum, we ￿nd that a new regime with free entry and reduced markups
can generate substantial cost savings to consumers (tax payers) without the risk of reducing
the availability of supply.2 This strongly indicates that the current regime with restricted
entry and high regulated markups protects the private interests of pharmacies rather than
the public interest.
2We also draw conclusions on a partial removal of the entry restrictions. This may be a politically more
realistic policy option that better respects the large sunk investments by many of the pharmacies.
2There is a small related empirical literature on free entry and social ine¢ ciency. Berry and
Waldfogel (1999) consider radio stations and Hsieh and Moretti (2003) look at real estate
agents. Using di⁄erent empirical methodologies, both studies document how free entry
can be socially ine¢ cient. Our own paper considers a case in which a combined policy of
restricted entry and high regulated markups can be ine¢ cient. By simultaneously loosening
the entry restrictions and lowering the regulated markups such that the total number of
entrants in the country remains constant, we can draw inferences about policy issues such
as local geographic coverage and shifts in rents between pharmacies and consumers.
The existing literature on professional regulation has only focused on the less extreme
entry restrictions in the form of minimum standards of competency. These are usually referred
to as professional or occupational licensing in the U.S.; see e.g. Kleiner￿ s (2000) overview.
The evidence on the e⁄ects of such entry restrictions has been mixed. Some studies ￿nd that
professional licensing may raise prices or earnings in speci￿c cases, e.g. Kleiner and Kudrle
(2000) for dentists, and Kleiner (2000) and Pagliero (2004) for lawyers, thus supporting the
private interest view.3 Other studies however ￿nd evidence in favour of the public interest
view. Most notably, Law and Kim (2004) undertook a comprehensive historical study on the
introduction of educational licensing during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century
in the U.S. They ￿nd that professional licensing has not restricted entry into professions
in general (and in the one exception where it did, there was no e⁄ect on earnings). In
contrast with this literature, we look at the e⁄ects of more stringent entry regulations,
i.e. geographic entry restrictions, and we show how this can be studied naturally within
an empirical model of entry. At least in this case, we ￿nd unambiguous support that the
geographic entry restrictions are not in the public interest. Hence, our results point out that
professional regulation beyond pure licensing, which is still very common in the European
countries, should be considered with extreme care.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the markets of pharmacies and
physicians, with the entry and conduct regulations, and introduces the data set. Section 3
presents the econometric entry model and section 4 discusses the empirical results. Section
5 discusses the implications for policy reform and section 6 concludes.
3A variant of the private interest view on regulation is that it serves the regulators￿interest (rather than
the industry￿ s). Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) ￿nd evidence from a comparison
between 85 countries that entry restrictions mainly bene￿t politicians and bureaucrats.
32 The markets of pharmacies and physicians
Health care markets are subject to extensive regulation in most countries. The regulations
have often been motivated by e¢ ciency considerations; Dranove and Satterwaite (2000)
provide an overview of the various market failures associated with the supply of basic health
care services. In addition, equity concerns and private interests have often been invoked to
explain the government interventions. In this section we provide a selective overview of the
health care markets in which the pharmacies and physicians operate in Belgium. We focus on
those elements that motivate our econometric model. We begin with a discussion of the entry
process, including the presence of geographic entry restrictions on the pharmacies as imposed
by the Belgian government. We next discuss the general economic and regulatory factors
in￿ uencing the nature of competitive interaction within and between the two professions.
Finally, we provide descriptive statistics of our collected data set, documenting some of the
discussion and introducing our subsequent econometric analysis.
2.1 Entry and geographic restrictions
Both pharmacies and physicians need to satisfy minimum educational standards. Otherwise,
their services are not covered by the health insurance companies, and a di⁄erent professional
title must be used. Physicians, which we de￿ne as general practitioners (as opposed to
specialists), need to obtain a university degree in medical sciences. Until recently, every
high school graduate was eligible to start this degree. Since 1998, there is an introductory
examination at the start of the ￿rst year in one region of the country (Flanders) to restrict
the number of incoming students. However, this potential entry restriction is irrelevant for
our empirical analysis, which covers the year 2001 (i.e. before the 1998 incoming students
graduated). In practice, only a minority of the students (about 25%) with a medical degree
choose to become a physician (in the sense of a general practitioner). Other employment
opportunities are to become a specialist, an occupational health o¢ cer, an expert for the
health insurer, etc. For practical purposes it is thus reasonable to think of a fairly large pool
of individuals satisfying the minimum educational standards required to become a physician.
There are no essential further restrictions to setting up a physician￿ s practice.4 In particular, a
physician can choose to locate an establishment anywhere in Belgium. According to the WIV,
the majority of physicians (about 78%) currently operate as a single-person establishment.
4There are some requirements of secondary importance. First, the Medical Committee needs to certify
the medical degree and the applicant has to enroll with the medical association, the so-called ￿Order of
Physicians￿ . Second, it is necessary to register at the National Institute of Health Insurance (RIZIV), so
that the medical consultation services to consumers can be covered by the health insurance companies.
4In recent years, there has been a development to form associations of several physicians, but
these are considerably less developed than in other countries.
Pharmacies also need to satisfy minimum educational standards.5 A university degree
in pharmaceutical sciences provides the right to independently prepare and sell drugs in
an existing establishment. However, in contrast to the physicians￿case, this degree is not
su¢ cient to entitle one to set up a new establishment. Since 1974, there exists an estab-
lishment act, imposing geographic entry restrictions on the number of pharmacies. Many
other European countries have adopted similar acts. The most comparable population-based
establishment acts exist in Finland, France and Portugal; other countries with geographic
entry restrictions include Spain, Italy and the U.K.6 The act stipulates that there should
be no more than one pharmacy per 2,000 inhabitants in small municipalities (with fewer
than 7,500 inhabitants); no more than one pharmacy per 2,500 inhabitants in intermedi-
ate municipalities (with a number of inhabitants between 7,500 and 30,000); and no more
than one pharmacy per 3,000 inhabitants in the larger municipalities. For example, in a
municipality with 6,000 inhabitants, there can be no more than one pharmacy per 2,000
inhabitants, implying that there can be at most 3 pharmacies. The act provides slightly
more lenient, i.e. lower threshold population levels if the physical distance between a new
candidate pharmacy and any incumbent is su¢ cient large. Because of the establishment act,
people with a university degree in pharmaceutical studies have only two ways to start an
independent pharmacy: either apply for a new establishment at a location where the entry
restrictions are not yet binding, or buy an existing pharmacy from an incumbent. The latter
is the more common event; it is often a transaction between an incumbent who has reached
retirement age and a candidate pharmacist who has obtained several years of experience in
the same or in another pharmacy.7
2.2 Competitive interaction
We ￿rst discuss the geographic dimension, showing that competitive interaction essentially
takes place at the local level. Next, we discuss the relevant institutional factors determin-
ing the (local) competitive interaction within each of the professions and between the two
professions.
5For a more detailed discussion on the regulation of pharmacies in Belgium, we refer to Philipsen (2003).
6The UK has geographic entry restrictions due to the presence of NHS dispensing contracts.
7The average number of pharmacists (with a university degree) working in a pharmacy is 1.5. Hence, as
in the physicians￿case, most pharmacies operate as single-person establishments.
5Competitive interaction at the geographic level
Consistent with earlier health care studies, it is reasonable to de￿ne the relevant geo-
graphic markets at the town level. The population within each town is typically concen-
trated around the center, with the exception of the densely populated urban areas, which we
will exclude from our sample. As will be discussed below, both physicians and pharmacies
cannot engage in advertising or other active promotional selling activities, so that it is rea-
sonable to expect that the patients￿choices are largely guided by local information. Survey
evidence indicates that the majority of patients do indeed not travel outside their town to
visit a physician. In the Netherlands, a country with similar demographic characteristics as
Belgium, 85% of the patients travel less than 5 kilometers, which usually falls within the
geographic boundaries of the town. Furthermore, 94% of the Belgian patients have a single
￿xed physician, which is conceivably located close to the patient￿ s home. For the pharmacies,
a recent study by the OFT (2003) ￿nds that only 6% of the patients visit their pharmacy
while commuting to work, further con￿rming the local nature of competitive interaction.
Competitive interaction within each of the two professions
Physicians provide medical consultations on a fee-for-service basis. A ￿xed price is nego-
tiated between the government and the health insurer. Physicians are free to charge a higher
price, but the social insurance companies do not reimburse patients for the extra price.
In practice, only 15% of the physicians have not signed the ￿xed price agreement. Self-
regulation traditionally prevented physicians from competing through advertising, though in
recent years and under pressure of the European Commission there has been an increased
tolerance towards informative advertising. While price and advertising competition have tra-
ditionally been quite limited, physicians have a broad range of other instruments to compete
for patients: availability (consultation hours, waiting times and possibility to make appoint-
ment), quality and time spent on medical consultations (which can show a large variation
among physicians), and willingness to provide medical prescriptions and sick-days.
Pharmacies have the exclusive right to sell drugs. In contrast to most other countries,
this exclusivity applies to both prescribed drugs and over-the-counter (OTC) drugs. The
prices of drugs are ￿xed by the Ministry of Economic A⁄airs, after negotiations with the
pharmaceutical companies and the pharmacies￿association. The pharmacies obtain a ￿xed
margin of 31% of the drug price, up to a ceiling of 7.44e per package; this implies an e⁄ective
margin of 28% (de Bruyn (1994)). Consequently, for most products there is essentially no
price competition.8 Advertising has until recently also been prevented due to self-regulation
8There is, however, some price competition for the pharmacists￿own preparations and for some other
general care products (such as cosmetics). But since these constitute a small fraction of overall sales, the
6by the pharmacies￿association, but there are various potential non-price instruments: avail-
ability (opening hours), quality of service and advice, and the supply of an assortment of
general care products.
To summarize, competition among physicians and among pharmacies has until recently
been limited with respect to price and advertising instruments, but they have a variety of
other instruments at their disposal to compete for patients.
Competitive interaction between the two professions
The two professions￿core services are potentially strong complements: physicians provide
medical consultations and prescribe drugs, while pharmacies are responsible for selling the
drugs. As a result, the nearby presence of one profession could strongly bene￿t the other
profession (since geographic proximity matters, as we discussed above). The degree of com-
plementarity is however not perfect, and it may actually be asymmetric: not all consultations
end with a prescription, and several drugs can be sold by pharmacies without a prescrip-
tion. If patients would often visit the physician without a subsequent visit to the pharmacy
(because no drug was prescribed), then the presence of a pharmacy would only have a small
impact on the physicians￿pro￿t. Hence, pharmacies would only be weak complements to
physicians. Similarly, if patients would often visit a pharmacy without a preceding visit to
the physician (because the drug requires no prescription or was prescribed by a specialist),
then physicians would only be weak complements to pharmacies. The degree of complemen-
tarity is therefore an empirical question. The above study by the OFT (2003) suggests there
is a strong complementary link between both professions: up to 47% of U.K. patients go to
the pharmacy immediately after having visited their physician.
While the professions￿core services are complementary, they regularly operate on each
other domain, so that they may also be viewed as providing substitute services. This has
led to many con￿ icts between pharmacies and physicians.9 In addition to providing medical
advice, physicians frequently o⁄er free drugs to their patients, obtained from the pharma-
ceutical companies as a way to promote their products. The pharmacies do not oppose to
such drug promotions per se, but they claim that the distribution should remain the ex-
clusive right of the pharmacies. Conversely, pharmacies also provide services that are in
the physicians￿domain. They o⁄er an increasing amount of independent medical advice to
patients when selling their drugs. This development has actually been actively promoted by
the European Commission: in the near future, pharmacies will be partly rewarded on a fee-
overall extent of price competition is limited, just as in the physicians￿case.
9An interesting discussion of the con￿ icts arising from competition between physicians and pharmacies
is provided in an article of the Belgian newspaper De Standaard (08/06/2004), with the self-explanatory
translated title ￿Why physicians want to sell drugs, and pharmacies want to provide medical consultations.￿
7for-service basis, rather than as a percentage of their sales, giving them additional incentives
to provide medical advice; they will also obtain the right to substitute the prescribed drugs
by equivalent but less expensive generic alternatives.
In sum, while the professions￿core services are complementary, they often operate on
each others￿domain, so that they may also be viewed as providing substitute services. Our
empirical framework will investigate in detail the question as to whether and to which extent
the professions provide complementary or substitute services.
The above discussion has largely focused on the demand-side factors in￿ uencing the ex-
tent of competitive interaction. In principle, competitive interaction may also stem from
supply side factors. For example, pharmacies and physicians may generate knowledge spill-
overs and learning e⁄ects, which can a⁄ect both their variable and ￿xed costs. The health
care literature we have surveyed has however not put emphasis on these sources of compet-
itive interaction, so we will interpret our empirical ￿ndings below as largely stemming from
demand-side sources.
2.3 Overview of the data
An overview of the data documents part of the above discussion, and introduces our subse-
quent econometric analysis. The data set contains information on 1;136 markets in 2001,
de￿ned at the town-level motivated by our earlier discussion of the relevant geographic mar-
kets. To reduce potential problems with overlapping markets, we do not include urban towns,
which are de￿ned by a population density of more than 800 per km2 or a population of more
than 15;000. This reduces our sample of towns to 847.10 We have information on the number
of active pharmacies and physicians per market.11 We combine this with information on the
demographic characteristics of each market.12
Table 1 presents counts of the observed market con￿gurations, which we will model in our
econometric analysis. For example, there are 142 markets with no pharmacies or physicians,
and 58 markets with one pharmacy and two physicians. There are also several market
con￿gurations that never occur, e.g. three physicians and more than three pharmacies.
More generally, the table shows that there is a quite strong correlation between the number of
10We also did our empirical analysis based on the full sample of 1;136 towns, and obtained similar con-
clusions.
11This information is from RIZIV (the National Institute of Health Insurance). In accordance with RIZIV,
a physician is de￿ned as a general practitioner who has more than 49 patients and has annually more than
199 consultations, of which more than 0.9% are house visits.
12The demographic characteristics were provided by the NIS (National Institute of Statistics), Ecodata
(Federal Government Agency for Economics), and the RSZ (the National Institute of Social Security)
8pharmacies and physicians; the correlation coe¢ cient is 0:85. This strong correlation may be
due to common observed and unobserved factors in￿ uencing the pro￿tability of pharmacies
and physicians. However, our discussion above suggested that the correlation may also be due
to the fact that both professions provide complementary services. Our econometric analysis
is able to distinguish between these alternative possibilities.
The ￿nal row shows the percentage of all markets (broken down by the number of phar-
macies), in which the geographic entry restriction imposed on the pharmacies is binding, in
the sense that no additional pharmacies are allowed to enter by the establishment act. This
will be important in our empirical analysis. The entry restrictions are binding for 82:3% of
all the markets. Binding entry restrictions occur the least frequently in markets with two
established pharmacies, but even here the percentage is quite large (74:7%). Note that when
entry restrictions are binding, establishment act may sometimes be violated. This is due to
historical factors, since many pharmacies were set up in anticipation of the act, and these
pharmacies were not forced to shut down at the moment the act was introduced.13 However,
the excess number of pharmacies is generally small in these cases, and it is in any case not
relevant for our econometric framework below.
< table 1 >
Table 2 provides summary statistics on the demographic variables, which may a⁄ect the
pro￿tability of both professions. We include information on population size, the percentage
of young people (under the age of 18), the percentage of elderly (over the age of 65), the
percentage of foreigners, the unemployment rate, mean income, and a dummy variable to
account for structural di⁄erences between the region of Flanders and Wallonia.
< table 2 >
3 The entry model
Our entry model ￿ts in the recent empirical entry literature, as initiated by Bresnahan and
Reiss (1990, 1991) and Berry (1992). This literature models entry as a strategic game, and
aims to draw inferences about unobserved payo⁄s ￿a latent variable ￿from the equilib-
rium relationship between the observed market structure and market characteristics, such
as market size. Our own model is a static one, in the spirit of Mazzeo (2001); for dynamic
entry models see Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2005) and their review of other recent work.
13In some cases a violation of the entry restrictions may be due to an exception clause in the act, which
allows an additional entry under certain circumstances (population and distance of existing pharmacies).
9Mazzeo distinguishes between two types of substitute ￿rms, and he models the total number
of ￿rms of each type as the (unique) equilibrium outcome of a strategic free entry game. We
extend the static entry literature in two respects. First, we account for the fact that entry
may not be free, i.e. there may be binding entry restrictions for one of the two types of ￿rms.
Second, we allow for the possibility that the entry decisions of ￿rms of di⁄erent types are
either strategic complements or strategic substitutes, since neither possibility can be ruled
out a priori in our case.14
3.1 Payo⁄s
There are two types of ￿rms, i = 1;2, with a large pool of ￿rms for each type. In our
application, ￿rms of type 1 are pharmacies, and ￿rms of type 2 are physicians. Each ￿rm
decides whether or not to enter the market. The entry decisions can be summarized by the
total number of ￿rms of each type i entering the market, as denoted by the random variable
Ni. Equilibrium realizations of this random variable are denoted by ni. Firms of type 1 are
subject to an entry restriction N1 ￿ n1, i.e. in each market there cannot be more than n1
￿rms. This is determined by population criteria, as discussed in section 2. If N1 < n1, the
entry restriction is not binding in equilibrium; if N1 = n1 the entry restriction is binding.
Firms of the same type are identical, i.e. they have the same payo⁄functions. If a ￿rm of
either type i does not enter, its payo⁄s are zero. If a ￿rm of type i enters, its payo⁄s depend
on the total number of entering ￿rms of both types, as given by:
￿
￿
i(N1;N2) = ￿i(N1;N2) ￿ "i; (1)
where ￿i(N1;N2) is the deterministic component of payo⁄s, and "i is a random component,
unobserved to the econometrician. The precise relationship between the payo⁄s and the
number of ￿rms of each type re￿ ects the nature of competitive interaction. Our main as-
sumption is that entry decisions by ￿rms of the same type are strategic substitutes, i.e. when
one ￿rm decides to enter, the payo⁄s from entry by another ￿rm of the same type decreases.
This amounts to assuming that payo⁄s are decreasing in the number of ￿rms of the same
type.
14Previous work has not considered the possibility that entry is restricted. As far as we know, it has also
not considered the possibility of strategic complements within an equilibrium entry model. One interesting
paper is Cohen and Mazzeo (2005), who investigate whether branch investments are strategic complements
based on an alternative approach. In their setting the branching decision is a discrete variable that may take
more than two values. This substantially increases the dimension of the problem, making it computationally
di¢ cult to develop the equilibrium conditions for the number of branches. As an alternative, they therefore
specify reaction functions for the branching decisions (accounting for endogeneity of the rivals￿choices).
10Assumption 1. (Entry decisions by ￿rms of the same type are strategic substitutes)
￿1(N1 + 1;N2) < ￿1(N1;N2)
￿2(N1;N2 + 1) < ￿2(N1;N2)
This assumption is consistent with the previous empirical entry literature, and is central to
characterize the Nash equilibrium outcomes below.
Regarding ￿rms of di⁄erent types, we do not make a priori assumptions as to whether
their entry decisions are strategic substitutes, strategic complements, or independent. Our
background discussion on competitive interaction in section 2 made it clear that this is
ultimately an empirical question in the case of pharmacies and physicians. Mazzeo (2001)
and subsequent entry contributions have considered the case in which the entry decisions by
￿rms of di⁄erent types are strategic substitutes, implying that payo⁄s are not only decreasing
in the number of ￿rms of the own type, but also in the number of ￿rms of the other type
(though to a lesser extent). Since the alternative case of strategic complements has not
been studied before, and since this is also what we will ￿nd empirically, we concentrate the
exposition in the text on this case. In the Appendix, we describe the case in which the entry
decisions by ￿rms of di⁄erent types are strategic substitutes.15
The case in which entry decisions by ￿rms of di⁄erent types are strategic complements
or independent may be summarized as follows.
Assumption 2. (Entry decisions by ￿rms of di⁄erent types are strategic complements or
independent)
(a) ￿1(N1;N2) ￿ ￿1(N1;N2 + 1)
￿2(N1;N2) ￿ ￿2(N1 + 1;N2)
(b) ￿1(N1 + 1;N2 + 1) < ￿1(N1;N2)
￿2(N1 + 1;N2 + 1) < ￿2(N1;N2)
Assumption 2 (a) states that payo⁄s are either increasing or independent of the number of
￿rms of the other type, so that the entry decisions by ￿rms of di⁄erent types are (weak)
strategic complements. Assumption 2 (b) says that the extent of strategic complementarity
between ￿rms of di⁄erent types is weaker than the extent of strategic substitutability between
￿rms of the same type. Hence, payo⁄s decrease when there is an additional ￿rm of both the
own type and the other type.16
15It is also possible that the entry decisions by ￿rms of di⁄erent types are sometimes strategic complements,
and sometimes strategic substitutes. We do not consider these mixed possibilities.
16Strictly speaking, we only require one of the pair of inequalities in Assumption 2 (b) to be strict.
11Based on these assumptions, we can now derive the equilibrium number of ￿rms and
the implied likelihood function to be taken to the data. In the empirical analysis, we will
verify whether these assumptions are indeed satis￿ed at the obtained parameter estimates
and confront this with the alternative case in which entry decisions by ￿rms of di⁄erent types
are strategic substitutes.
3.2 Equilibrium with nonbinding entry restrictions
When entry restrictions are not binding, i.e. N1 < n1, each ￿rm freely decides whether or
not to enter, given the entry decisions of the other ￿rms. As is well-known, there is a large
number of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in this entry game. Bresnahan and Reiss (1990)
resolve this problem in two alternative ways. First, they aggregate the non-unique Nash
equilibrium outcomes to obtain an econometric model for the total number of ￿rms entering
in a Nash equilibrium. In their application in which all ￿rms are substitutes, this yields
a unique prediction for the total number of entering ￿rms. Second, they put additional
structure to the entry game and assume that ￿rms move sequentially. This alternative
approach yields a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium at the disaggregate ￿rm level.
Mazzeo (2001) can be viewed as a combination of both approaches: he speci￿es a model for
the total number of ￿rms per type entering in a Nash equilibrium, and then re￿nes the Nash
equilibrium to obtain a unique prediction for the total number of ￿rms per type.17 We take
a related approach here.
The market con￿guration (n1;n2) is a Nash equilibrium outcome if and only if the random
component of pro￿ts " = ("1;"2) satis￿es the following conditions:
￿1(n1 + 1;n2) < "1 ￿ ￿1(n1;n2) (2)
￿2(n1;n2 + 1) < "2 ￿ ￿2(n1;n2):
When (2) is satis￿ed, n1 ￿rms of type 1, and n2 of type 2 ￿nd it pro￿table to enter, and
no additional ￿rm of either type has an incentive to enter; hence (n1;n2) is indeed a Nash
equilibrium outcome. Assumption 1 guarantees that there are realizations of " for which (2)
holds, so that the market con￿guration (n1;n2) is observed with positive probability.
However, (n1;n2) may show multiplicity with other Nash equilibrium outcomes for some
realizations of ". This is illustrated in Figure 1. The bold lines delineate the areas of " for
which the market con￿gurations (1;2) and (2;3) are the Nash equilibrium outcomes. The
17There have also been alternative approaches to the multiplicity of equilibria in static entry games. Seim
(2005) introduces incomplete information to the entry game to obtain uniqueness. Ciliberto and Tamer (2004)
draw inference from a class of models rather than re￿ning the equilibrium to obtain a unique prediction.
12shaded rectangle is the area of overlap, where both market con￿gurations are Nash equilib-
rium outcomes. Note that the area of multiplicity would disappear if ￿rms are independent,
i.e. if the conditions in Assumption 2(a) hold with equality, so that ￿1(2;2) = ￿1(2;3) and
￿2(1;3) = ￿2(2;3). As the extent of complementarity increases, the area of multiplicity in-
creases. Figure 2 shows an extreme case of strong complementarity. In this case, the entire
area of " for which (1;2) is a Nash equilibrium outcome is a subset of the area of " for
which (2;3) is a Nash equilibrium. Hence, there would be no " for which (1;2) is a Nash
equilibrium without (2;3) also being one. Assumption 2(b) rules out this possibility, since it
requires that ￿1(2;3) < ￿1(1;2) and ￿2(2;3) < ￿2(1;2).
In general, the multiplicity of Nash equilibrium outcomes can be characterized as follows.
If ￿rms of di⁄erent types are independent, i.e. Assumption 2(a) holds with equality, then
the market con￿guration (n1;n2) is the unique Nash equilibrium outcome in the area of
" satisfying (2). In contrast, if the entry decisions of ￿rms of di⁄erent types are strategic
complements, i.e. Assumption 2(a) holds with strict inequality, then (n1;n2) may show mul-
tiplicity with other Nash equilibrium outcomes for some realizations of ". In the Appendix,
we show the following three results:
1. (n1;n2) may only show multiplicity with Nash equilibrium outcomes of the form (n1 +
m;n2+m), where m is a positive or a negative integer. For example, if (1;2) is a Nash
equilibrium outcome, there may be multiplicity with, say, (0;1) or (2;3) or (3;4) but
not with (2;4).
2. (n1;n2) necessarily shows multiplicity with (n1 + 1;n2 + 1) and (n1 ￿ 1;n2 ￿ 1). The
area of multiplicity with (n1 + 1;n2 + 1) is given by:
￿1(n1 + 1;n2) < "1 ￿ ￿1(n1 + 1;n2 + 1) (3)
￿2(n1;n2 + 1) < "2 ￿ ￿2(n1 + 1;n2 + 1);
and similarly for (n1 ￿ 1;n2 ￿ 1).
3. While (n1;n2) may also show multiplicity with (n1 + m;n2 + m) for m > 1 or m < 1,
these areas of multiplicity are necessarily a subset of the areas of multiplicity with
(n1 + 1;n2 + 1) and (n1 ￿ 1;n2 ￿ 1).
Taken together, these results imply that the areas of " for which (n1;n2) shows multiplicity
with any other Nash equilibrium outcome are simply given by the areas of overlap with the
outcomes (n1 + 1;n2 + 1) (given by (3)) and (n1 ￿ 1;n2 ￿ 1).
The multiplicity problem follows from the weak structure implied by the Nash equilib-
rium concept. To obtain unique predictions, we put additional structure on the entry game.
13We assume that ￿rms make their entry decisions sequentially, i.e. after observing all previ-
ous entry decisions, and impose the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium re￿nement.18 With
complementary entry decisions, it is not necessary to make speci￿c assumptions regarding
the exact ordering of entry moves. This additional structure makes it possible to assign a
unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome to every realization of ". Suppose " is such
that both (n1;n2) and (n1 + m;n2 + m) are Nash equilibrium outcomes (with m a positive
or negative integer). The outcome with the fewest number of ￿rms cannot be subgame per-
fect, since there would then always be an additional ￿rm of one type with an incentive to
enter, in anticipation of triggering further entry by a ￿rm of the other type as well. Hence,
when there are multiple Nash equilibrium outcomes, the one with the largest number of
￿rms is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Making use of our earlier characterization
of the multiplicity of Nash equilibrium outcomes, it immediately follows that (n1;n2) will
be a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome if and only if (i) " satis￿es conditions (2)
and (ii) " does not satisfy conditions (3). This can be illustrated on Figure 1. The market
con￿guration (1;2) is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome if and only if " falls in
the relevant area bounded by the bold lines, minus the shaded area in the lower left corner.
Assuming that " has a bivariate density f(￿), it is now possible to derive the probabil-
ity that the market con￿guration (n1;n2) will be observed as the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium outcome when entry restrictions are not binding:











f(u1;u2)du1du2 ￿ P(n1;n2): (4)
3.3 Equilibrium with binding entry restrictions
When the entry restrictions are binding, N1 = n1, the analysis needs to be modi￿ed. Essen-
tially, there are some ￿rms of type 1 (pharmacies in our application) that have an incentive
to enter but are not able to do so because of the restriction. This has the following immediate
18This approach is in the spirit of Mazzeo (2002), but adapted to the circumstances of our application to
health care professions. Mazzeo assumes that ￿rms can choose their type at or after entering. We instead
assume that there is a given pool of entrants of each type. At that point, ￿rms can only make entry decisions
and can no longer choose to change their type. This yields somewhat di⁄erent conditions for selecting the
unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome.
14implication. From the market con￿guration (n1;n2) it is no longer possible to infer that entry
by n1 + 1 ￿rms would be unpro￿table. Hence, with binding entry restrictions the market
con￿guration (n1;n2) is a Nash equilibrium outcome if and only if " satis￿es the following
conditions:
"1 ￿ ￿1(n1;n2)
￿2(n1;n2 + 1) < "2 ￿ ￿2(n1;n2):
(5)
For ￿rms of type 2 these conditions are still the same as in (2). For ￿rms of type 1 they
are di⁄erent, since it is no longer possible to infer a lower bound on pro￿ts from observing
(n1;n2). This actually simpli￿es the problem of multiple Nash equilibrium outcomes. With
nonbinding entry restrictions, we showed that (n1;n2) may only show multiplicity with Nash
equilibrium outcomes of the form (n1 + m;n2 + m), with m either a positive or a negative
integer. When the entry restrictions are binding, it is immediately obvious that there can no
longer be such multiplicity for positive integers m. Hence, (n1;n2) can only have multiplicity
with equilibria of the form (n1+m;n2+m), for negative integers m. However, similar to the
case of nonbinding entry restrictions, the equilibrium with the fewer number of ￿rms cannot
be selected as the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Hence, with binding entry restrictions
on ￿rms of type 1, the market con￿guration (n1;n2) is the unique subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium if and only if " satis￿es (5).
The probability of observing the market con￿guration (n1;n2) as the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium when entry restrictions are binding, i.e. when N1 = n1, is therefore:





f(u1;u2)du1du2 ￿ P(n1;n2): (6)
3.4 Econometric speci￿cation
We can now specify the likelihood function for our sample of observations on market con￿g-
urations and the corresponding market characteristics. We suppress a market subscript m
indexing the unit of observation. In both the case of nonbinding and binding entry restric-
tions, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome for every possible realization
of ". Hence, the probabilities of observing a market con￿guration, as derived by (4) and (6),
can be sensibly used to construct the likelihood function. De￿ning a dummy variable d = 1 if
N1 < n1 and d = 0 otherwise, the contribution to the likelihood function of a representative
observed market con￿guration is:
lC = P(n1;n2)d + P(n1;n2)(1 ￿ d); (7)
15where the probability terms are de￿ned above by (4) and (6). We use the subscript C
in lC to emphasize that the likelihood contributions entering the likelihood function have
been derived under the assumption that the entry decisions of ￿rms of di⁄erent types are
strategic complements. In the Appendix, we consider the alternative possibility of strategic
substitutes, and derive the corresponding likelihood contributions, lS. We will estimate both
alternative models, and subsequently verify whether the assumptions are met at the obtained
parameter estimates.
Specify the density f(￿) as the bivariate normal density, with a parameter ￿ measuring
the correlation between "1 and "2. There are some interesting special cases of this model.
First, if ￿rms of di⁄erent types are independent, the second term in (4) vanishes, so that the
model reduces to a bivariate ordered probit model with censoring, where the censoring refers
to observations where the entry restrictions are binding. Second, if in addition the entry
restriction is not binding for any observation, the model reduces to a uncensored bivariate
ordered probit model. Third, if the correlation parameter ￿ = 0, we end up with two
traditional ordered probit models, one for each type, as estimated by Bresnahan and Reiss
(1991) and several subsequent contributions. In the empirical analysis, we will also present
the results from the ￿rst two special cases and compare it with the general model.
It remains to specify the payo⁄ function entering the likelihood function through the
probabilities (4) and (6). There are two economic interpretations of the payo⁄s ￿￿
i(N1;N2),
both with the required property that a ￿rm would enter if and only if ￿￿
i(N1;N2) ￿ 0.
In a direct interpretation payo⁄s are simply pro￿ts, i.e. variable pro￿ts minus ￿xed costs.
We adopt an appealing alternative interpretation here, similar to Genesove (2001). De￿ne a
￿rm￿ s pro￿ts as ￿￿
i(N1;N2) = Vi(N1;N2)exp(￿"i)￿Fi(N1;N2), where Vi(N1;N2) is variable
pro￿ts, Fi(N1;N2) is ￿xed costs, and "i is a multiplicative error term capturing unobserved
variable pro￿ts or ￿xed costs. Firms enter if and only if ￿￿




i(N1;N2) = ln(Vi(N1;N2)=Fi(N1;N2)) ￿ "i ￿ 0: (8)
Hence, we can interpret a ￿rm￿ s payo⁄s ￿￿
i(N1;N2) as the log of the variable pro￿ts to
￿xed costs ratio. Consider the following linear speci￿cation, in which all variables have the
interpretation of a⁄ecting the log of the variable pro￿ts to ￿xed costs ratio:
￿
￿




i=j ￿ "i: (9)
The variable S is market size, measured by the number of consumers (population), X is
a vector of other observed market characteristics, such as average income, percentage of




i are ￿xed e⁄ects for type i when there are, respectively, j ￿rms of the own type and
k ￿rms of the other type.
The ￿xed e⁄ects ￿
j
i are similar to the ￿cut-values￿in simple ordered probit models, and
measure the e⁄ect of j ￿rms of the own type on payo⁄s. The ￿xed e⁄ects ￿k
i measure the e⁄ect
of k ￿rms of the other type on payo⁄s, and re￿ ect the extent of complementarity between the
entry decisions of di⁄erent types. One may reasonably expect the complementarity e⁄ect to
be stronger when there are few ￿rms of the own type. We incorporate this by dividing ￿k
i by
the number of ￿rms of the own type j. A more general approach would be to specify a full
set of ￿xed e⁄ects ￿
jk




i=j. This more general speci￿cation would however require a too large number of
parameters to be estimated.
As is common in discrete choice models, the scale of the payo⁄s is not identi￿ed. To
proceed with estimation, we restrict the standard deviation of "i, ￿i, to be equal to one.
This restriction is irrelevant for our empirical analysis in section 4. In section 5, however,
we need to identify the scale of the payo⁄s, so we will then put additional structure on the
payo⁄s.
Apart from the scaling issue, the ￿xed e⁄ects ￿
j
i and ￿k
i are not all identi￿ed. Let J be
the maximum number of ￿rms observed in any market of the own type, and K the maximum







i . To identify the model, set ￿0
i = ￿1, ￿
J+1
i = 1, ￿1
i = 0,
￿0
i = 0, and ￿
K+1
i = ￿K
i for each i.19 Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that the model is internally
consistent if the estimated ￿xed e⁄ects ￿
j
i and ￿k
i entering (9) satisfy the following conditions




















Since we normalized ￿1
i = 0 and ￿0




all be positive. The ￿rst row of inequalities in (10) simply says that an additional ￿rm of the
own type decreases the ratio of variable pro￿ts over ￿xed costs.20 The second row says that
19With these normalization assumptions, a constant term ￿
0
i in the vector ￿i is identi￿ed. Alternatively,
one can normalize this constant term to zero, and estimate ￿1
i.





i is a su¢ cient but not a necessary condition for Assumption 1 to be satis￿ed. The





i =((j(j + 1)). We presented the
su¢ cient condition, since it is easier to interpret in the empirical analysis, and since they were always met
anyway.
17an additional ￿rm of the other type increases the ratio of variable pro￿ts over ￿xed costs.
Finally, the third row says that an additional ￿rm of both types reduces the ratio of variable
pro￿ts over ￿xed costs. In the empirical analysis, we will verify whether these conditions are
satis￿ed. If they are, the estimates are consistent with the initial assumptions.
Finally, following Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) we de￿ne entry thresholds and entry thresh-
old ratios. We elaborate on these in some more detail, since their interpretation needs ad-
ditional care in our framework. The entry threshold S
j;k
i is the market size at which the
j-th ￿rm would just be willing to enter, when there are k ￿rms of the other type, i.e. the
market size such that the deterministic component of payo⁄s given by (9) is equal to zero.





























An entry threshold ratio greater than 1 means that the per-￿rm entry threshold has to
increase to support an additional ￿rm. In our framework, this can occur for two reasons.
First, as in Bresnahan and Reiss, additional entry may lead to lower margins and hence
more intense competition. This ￿competitive entry￿e⁄ect is captured by the ￿rst two terms
in (11). Second, additional entry means that the bene￿cial e⁄ect from complementarity
with the other-type ￿rms has to be shared with one more ￿rm. This is captured by the
third term in (11). Note that when no other-type ￿rms are present (k = 0), then the third
term vanishes (since ￿0
i = 0), so that the entry threshold ratios then have a clean competitive
entry interpretation as in Bresnahan and Reiss. In our empirical analysis, the entry threshold
ratios will be useful in two respects. First, they provide a natural starting point for imposing
restrictions on the number of ￿xed e⁄ects ￿
j
i to be estimated. Second, they are of independent






Our empirical analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we compare the model in which the
entry decisions of the di⁄erent types are strategic complements to the model in which they
are strategic substitutes; we ￿nd that only the ￿rst gives internally consistent parameter
estimates. Second, we discuss the parameter estimates of this model in more detail and
compare it to special cases, i.e. the bivariate ordered probit model in which di⁄erent types
are independent, with and without censoring for binding entry restrictions.
184.1 Strategic complements or substitutes?
Our ￿rst entry model, in which the entry decisions by ￿rms of di⁄erent types are strategic
complements, is given by (7). The second model, in which they are strategic substitutes,
is derived in the Appendix. We estimate both models, and verify whether the parameter
estimates are internally consistent, i.e. satisfy the implied restrictions (as given by (10) in
the case of strategic complements).
We begin with the ￿rst model, the case of strategic complements. There may be up to 11




i. It is necessary to impose restrictions on the pharmacies￿own-type ￿xed e⁄ects ￿
j
1,
since the entry restrictions are always binding in markets with more than 4 pharmacies: for
j > 4, we set ￿
j
1 such that there is no competitive entry e⁄ect.21 To estimate the other-type
￿xed e⁄ects, ￿k
i, we impose restrictions following a ￿bottom-up￿approach.22 We obtain a
speci￿cation with one signi￿cant other-type ￿xed e⁄ect for pharmacies, and four signi￿cant
other-type ￿xed e⁄ects for physicians. The model is internally consistent, i.e. the estimated
parameters satisfy all the conditions given by (10). We defer a more detailed discussion of the
economic interpretation of the ￿xed e⁄ects and the other parameters to the next subsection.
We adopt the same approach to estimate the alternative model, in which the entry de-
cisions of ￿rms of di⁄erent types are strategic substitutes. We ￿nd that this model is not
internally consistent, i.e. the estimated parameters violate the restrictions required by the
model. In particular, we ￿nd that entry by other-type ￿rms raises payo⁄s, while the assump-
tion of strategic substitutes requires the opposite. We conclude that the entry decisions of
pharmacies and physicians are strategic complements. In section 2, we discussed that there
were good reasons to expect complementarities, since patients usually require both services.
Yet, we did not rule out the possibility of substitutability, since the two professions often
provide overlapping services. Our empirical results thus provide more conclusive evidence
on this question, showing that on balance there is more strategic complementarity than
substitutability. We can now turn to a more detailed discussion of the empirical results.
21Following our discussion in section 3.4, this amounts to setting the ￿rst two terms in the entry threshold
ratio (11) equal to 1, so that the constrained ￿
j




1 + ￿1 ln((j ￿ 1)=j).





i , implying that there is no additional complementarity after a given number of other-type ￿rms
has entered. We subsequently verify whether the estimated ￿xed e⁄ects satisfy the conditions in (10), which
results in three cases. First, if the conditions are signi￿cantly violated, the model is internally inconsistent.
Second, if they are insigni￿cantly violated, we impose the relevant condition to hold with equality and re-





i , re-estimate the model and verify again the conditions (10).
194.2 Parameter estimates
Table 3 presents the parameter estimates from three di⁄erent models. The speci￿cation in
the ￿rst column is an uncensored bivariate probit model. This model assumes that di⁄erent
types are independent (no complementarity, so all ￿k
i = 0), and that there are no binding
entry restrictions. This model still allows the unobserved factors in￿ uencing the pharmacies￿
and physicians￿payo⁄s to be correlated (￿). The speci￿cation in the second column is a
censored bivariate probit model. It still assumes that di⁄erent types are independent, but
it accounts for the fact that entry restrictions on pharmacies are binding in some of the
markets. The speci￿cation in the third column is our general entry model, allowing the entry
decisions by the di⁄erent types to be strategic complements and accounting for binding entry
restrictions.
A comparison between the ￿rst and the second model clearly demonstrates the impor-
tance of accounting for the presence of geographic entry restrictions on pharmacies. Several
of the parameters change to a substantial extent. A Hausman test con￿rms that the pa-
rameters di⁄er signi￿cantly across the two estimators (test-statistic of 531:9). Hence, the
consistent model which accounts for the entry restrictions should be preferred. Furthermore,
a comparison between the second and the third speci￿cation shows that there are signi￿cant
strategic complementarities between the entry decisions of di⁄erent types (likelihood ratio
test-statistic of 41:78). It is interesting to point out that the correlation parameter ￿ is lower
in the third speci￿cation than in the second. Intuitively, the second speci￿cation suggests
there is a (small) positive correlation between the unobserved market characteristics a⁄ect-
ing the pharmacies￿and physicians￿payo⁄s, but this correlation drops once one accounts for
the presence of strategic complementarity. We now discuss the parameter estimates of the
general entry model in more detail.
< table 3 >
Market size, as measured by population, is the most important market characteristic
a⁄ecting the pharmacies￿and physicians￿payo⁄s. This is consistent with the results from
previous entry models, such as Bresnahan and Reiss (1991). In line with expectations, the
population￿ s age distribution has an important impact on payo⁄s. More speci￿cally, the
percentage of elderly in a market has a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on both professions￿
payo⁄s; the e⁄ect is stronger for the pharmacies. The other market characteristics only have
a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the payo⁄s of one of the two professions. The percentage of foreigners
has a negative e⁄ect on payo⁄s, but the e⁄ect is signi￿cant only in the case of physicians.
Physicians do not obtain signi￿cantly di⁄erent payo⁄s in markets with higher unemployment,
whereas pharmacies tend to obtain signi￿cantly higher payo⁄s in such markets, consistent
20with other studies showing that the unemployed tend to consume more drugs. Income per
capita positively and signi￿cantly a⁄ects the physicians￿payo⁄s. Finally, there are some
regional di⁄erences: payo⁄s to physicians are signi￿cantly lower in the region of Flanders
than in the other two regions (Brussels and Wallonia). This may be due to either di⁄erent
medical consumption habits or to better alternative employment opportunities in the region
of Flanders.
As discussed in the previous section, the entry ￿xed e⁄ects ￿
j
i and ￿k
i all satisfy the
conditions given by (10) to have an internally consistent model. More speci￿cally, the own-
type e⁄ects ￿
j
i are all positive and show an increasing pattern, as required by the ￿rst
condition in (10).23 This implies that additional entry by ￿rms of the same type lowers
payo⁄s. The same pattern occurs for the other-type e⁄ects ￿k
i, satisfying the second condition
in (10). This means that additional entry by ￿rms of di⁄erent types raises payo⁄s (strategic
complementarity). Finally, one can verify that the third condition in (10) is satis￿ed for all
observed market con￿gurations. Intuitively, this means that the extent of complementarity
between ￿rms of di⁄erent types is lower than the extent of substitutability between ￿rms of
the same type.
Note that the complementarities implied by other-type e⁄ects ￿k
i appear to be asym-
metric: pharmacies tend to yield larger bene￿ts to physicians than vice versa. As discussed
in section 2, such an asymmetry in complementarities could not be ruled out a priori. It
can be interpreted as follows. On the one hand, a visit to the physician may rather likely
result in a prescription and in a subsequent visit to the pharmacy. Hence, physicians tend
to bene￿t strongly from the nearby presence of pharmacies. On the other hand, a visit to
the pharmacy may often occur without a preceding visit to the physician (because of over-
the-counter drugs, or drugs prescribed by specialists), hence a pharmacy is less dependent
on the nearby presence of physicians.
To better interpret the magnitude of the complementarities implied by the other-type
e⁄ects ￿k
i, consider the change in market size required to support j ￿rms when one moves








i)=(j￿i)). The estimates imply that the market size required to support
one pharmacy when a physician is present is only 58% of the required market size when no
physician is present (standard error of 14%). Conversely, the market size required to support
one physician is not signi￿cantly lower in the presence than in the absence of a pharmacy
(ratio of 93% with a standard error of 8%). However, the market size required to support
one physician in the presence of two pharmacies is only 45% of the required market size in
the presence of one pharmacy (standard error of 10%).
23Recall that ￿1
i and ￿0
i are normalized to zero.
21Further insights in the magnitude of the own-type ￿xed e⁄ects ￿
j
i can be obtained from
the per-￿rm entry thresholds, as shown in Table 4. They are given by (11) and measure the
extent to which the per-￿rm market size has to increase to support an additional ￿rm of the
same type. As discussed above, because there are two types in the model their interpretation
is more complicated in our framework than in Bresnahan and Reiss￿ . If no other-type ￿rm is
present (k = 0), the entry threshold ratios can still be interpreted as measures of the e⁄ect
of additional entry on competition. But in the presence of other types, they also capture
the extent to which the bene￿cial e⁄ect from complementarity has to be shared with an
additional ￿rm.
We therefore concentrate our discussion of Table 4 on the entry threshold ratios in the ￿rst
column (k = 0), which have the standard interpretation of capturing the competitive e⁄ects
from entry. The numbers show that these entry threshold ratios are generally insigni￿cantly
di⁄erent from 1, for both pharmacies and physicians. To illustrate, the entry threshold ratio
for two pharmacies is 1:07 (standard error 0:14), which is insigni￿cantly di⁄erent from 1: the
per-￿rm market size to support a duopoly of pharmacies is thus insigni￿cantly di⁄erent from
the market size required to support a monopoly pharmacy. The general conclusion from
the ￿rst column is that additional entry does not appear to imply intensi￿ed competition.24
In section 2, we already discussed that neither pharmacies nor physicians can use price or
advertising to compete. Our estimates thus imply that both professions do also not appear
to use the other non-price instruments (such as quality of service) in response to additional
entry. Some caution is however warranted. In general, the entry threshold ratios are only
informative about the change in competition in response to entry, but not about the level
of competition to start with. In principle, it could thus be possible that even monopoly
pharmacies and physicians already behave competitively, because of the threat of new entry
as in contestable markets. However, at least for the pharmacies, this possibility appears to be
rather unlikely. As Table 1 showed, the entry restrictions stemming from the establishment
act are binding in the majority of the markets, so that most monopoly pharmacies are
e⁄ectively protected from the threat of new entry.
As a ￿nal point, we discuss the entry threshold ratios in the second and third column of
Table 4, which refer to markets in which there are one or two ￿rms of the other type. The
ratios are all greater than in the ￿rst column, and usually greater than 1. This is due to our
￿nding of signi￿cant complementarities: additional entry by a ￿rm of the same type means
that the bene￿cial e⁄ect from complementarity has to be shared with that additional ￿rm.
24One may compare the physicians￿threshold ratios to those obtained by Bresnahan and Reiss. They ￿nd
that the e⁄ect of a second entrant is strong (threshold ratio of about 2). But additional entrants no longer
have signi￿cant e⁄ects as is the case here (threshold ratios about 1 from the third entrant onwards).
22< table 4 >
5 Policy reform towards pharmacies
According to the public interest view, high regulated markups have been combined with
tight geographic entry restrictions to ensure a su¢ cient coverage of pharmacies in the less
attractive areas, without triggering excessive entry elsewhere. To evaluate whether this
view has empirical support, it is therefore necessary to assess the combined e⁄ects of both
liberalizing entry and reducing the regulated markups.
Our counterfactual analysis essentially proceeds as follows. To account for entry liberal-
ization, we adjust the maximum allowed number of ￿rms n1 upwards by a factor ￿ ￿ 1. To
account for the reduced regulated markups, we adjust the estimated intercept ￿
0
1 downwards
by an amount ￿1 ln(￿), where ￿ ￿ 1 refers to a given relative reduction in the net markups.
We then use the estimated model (the general entry model with strategic complements,
last column of Table 3) to make new entry predictions under alternative levels of ￿ and ￿.
The reader who is not interested in the details of our approach can skip section 5.1, and
immediately go to the discussion of the ￿ndings in section 5.2.
5.1 Approach
Entry liberalization is modelled by multiplying the maximum allowed number of ￿rms n1
per market by a common factor ￿ ￿ 1.25 The expected number of type 1 ￿rms (pharmacies)





where P(n1) and P(￿n1) are the marginal probabilities, as obtained from summing the joint
probabilities (4) and (6) over all n2. A similar expression holds for the expected number of
type 2 ￿rms (physicians). If ￿ = 1, we obtain the status quo predictions of the expected
number of ￿rms under the current regime. If ￿ is arbitrarily large, we obtain the predictions
when entry becomes completely free. Intermediate values of ￿ give predictions for partial
liberalization.
Computing the e⁄ects of an absolute reduction in the pharmacies￿regulated gross markups
￿, currently set at 28%, generally requires information on the pharmacies￿variable retail costs
25Equivalently, this amounts to dividing the population threshold criteria set out in the establishment act
by this factor ￿.
23other than wholesale costs. To avoid this identi￿cation issue, we ￿rst predict the e⁄ects of
a relative reduction in the net markups ￿, i.e. the gross markups ￿ net of other variable
retail costs. More precisely, we consider a drop in the net markups by a given factor ￿,
where 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1, i.e. a drop from ￿ to ￿￿. To proceed, we put additional structure on the
pharmacies￿payo⁄s ￿￿
1(N1;N2), which we interpreted earlier in (8) as the log of the variable
pro￿ts to ￿xed costs ratio. Assume that variable pro￿ts can be speci￿ed as:
V1(N1;N2) = ￿ ￿ R1(N1;N2) ￿ S; (12)
where R1(N1;N2) is revenues per consumer. This assumes that the net markups ￿ are
constant and uniform across markets, and that the variable pro￿ts per consumer are inde-
pendent of the number of consumers S. Both assumptions are reasonable for pharmacies.26
Now specify ln(R1(N1;N2)=F1(N1;N2)) = X￿1 ￿ ￿
j
1 + ￿k
1=j, and substitute this and (12) in
the payo⁄s ￿￿
1(N1;N2) given by (8). We then essentially obtain our earlier speci￿cation (9),
where the coe¢ cient on ln(S) is now restricted to 1, so that the standard deviation of "1, ￿1,
becomes identi￿ed. In other words, based on this additional structure our earlier population









containing the net markup ￿. In sum, lowering the pharmacies￿net markups from ￿ to ￿￿




1 + ￿1 ln(￿). The expected number of
￿rms can then be computed as before.
To retrieve the absolute reduction in the regulated gross markup ￿ corresponding to the
relative reduction in the net markup from ￿ to ￿￿, additional information on the variable
retail costs other than the wholesale costs is required. A reasonable starting point is to
assume that the other variable retail costs are zero, so that ￿ = ￿.27 The absolute reduction
in the gross regulated markups is then simply ￿(￿ ￿ 1), where ￿ = 28%. As a robustness
check, we will also consider the possibility that there are other variable retail costs, i.e.
￿ < ￿. It can be veri￿ed that the implied absolute gross markup reduction is then given
by ((1 ￿ ￿)=(1 ￿ ￿))￿(￿ ￿ 1). In this formula, we again have ￿ = 28%, and we set ￿ =
￿ ￿ 10% = 18%, i.e. we assume that other variable retail costs amount to 10%.
26Gross markups are regulated at a uniform rate and our empirical results showed no evidence of non-price
competition. Furthermore, there are no scale economies in distribution to pharmacies, apart from the ￿xed
costs of setting up a pharmacy.
27The pharmacies￿most important other retail costs are labor costs. It is not unreasonable to treat these
as ￿xed, since time spent on servicing patients is essentially ￿xed during opening hours (in contrast to
physicians who spend a variable amount of their time on servicing patients).
245.2 Findings
Table 5 summarizes the entry predictions under alternative regulatory policies towards entry
and markups of pharmacies. The results are based on the estimates of the general model
with strategic complements (third part of Table 3). We obtain similar results from the model
without strategic complements (second part of Table 3 with ￿k
i = 0), except that there
are of course no indirect e⁄ects on the physicians. Table 5 compares three entry regimes:
the status quo entry regulation (￿ = 1; panel A), ￿partial￿entry deregulation where the
maximum allowed number of pharmacies in each market is doubled (￿ = 2; panel B), and a
full free entry situation (￿ large; panel C). We also consider three possible net markups: no
change in the markups (￿ = 1; ￿rst column), and relative drops of 25% and 50% (￿ = 0:75
and ￿ = 0:5; second and third columns). Note that if pharmacies have no other variable
retail costs than wholesale costs, these relative net markup reductions amount to absolute
reductions in the regulated gross markups by respectively 7% and 14% (down from the
initial 28%). On the other hand, if the other variable retail costs are 10%, the net markup
reductions correspond to absolute gross markup reductions of 4% and 7:9%.
The ￿rst column of Table 5 shows the predictions under the three entry regimes, assuming
no changes in markups.28 The total number of pharmacies is predicted to increase from 1454
to 2074 (or +43%) under partial entry deregulation, and to 3035 (or +109%) under full
free entry. The current entry restrictions, which Table 1 documented to be binding in more
than 80% of the markets, are thus also economically important. Furthermore, the ￿rst
column shows that entry deregulation would also have indirect e⁄ects on the physicians.
Their number would increase from 4201 to 4232 (or +1%) under partial entry deregulation,
and to 4489 (or +7%) under full free entry. These e⁄ects stem from our earlier ￿nding that
the entry decisions of pharmacies and physicians are strategic complements. Finally, the
￿rst column shows how the geographic coverage of health care services changes after entry
deregulation. For example, full free entry would drastically reduce the number of markets in
which there is no pharmacy, from 250 to 104.
Policy makers have warned against too simple conclusions regarding the e⁄ects of liber-
alizing entry regulations. According to the public interest view the high regulated markups
and tight entry restrictions ensure a su¢ cient coverage of pharmacies in the less attractive
areas, without triggering excessive entry elsewhere. To evaluate this view, it is therefore
important to look at the e⁄ects of simultaneously liberalizing entry and lowering markups.
The second and the third columns of Table 5 show the results. If the net markups are
28The model predicts the status quo outcomes reasonably well. For example, Table 1 showed that there
are 246 (154) markets without any pharmacy (physician), whereas the model predicts that there are 250
(142) such markets.
25multiplied by factors of 0:75 and 0:5 without liberalizing the entry restrictions (second and
third columns of panel A), then the total number of pharmacies drops to respectively 1363
and 1191. The geographic coverage would also decrease. For example, the number of markets
without any pharmacy would increase by 12% to 279 if the net markups were lowered by
50%. In contrast, panel B and panel C show that the number of pharmacies would no longer
decrease if the markup reductions are accompanied by a su¢ cient liberalization of the entry
restrictions. For example, the number of pharmacies increases from 1454 to 1836 if a 50% net
markup reduction is combined with full free entry. Furthermore, geographic coverage is no
source of concern under these combined policies: the total number of markets without any
pharmacy always drops. Even if a net markup reduction of 50% is combined with partial
entry deregulation, the number of markets without a pharmacy would drop from 250 to 241.
The indirect e⁄ects on physicians are small but, if anything, the availability of physicians
increases when entry liberalization is combined with a lowering of the markups.
< table 5 >
This discussion strongly indicates that the public interest motivation for combining high
markups and tight entry restrictions as a way to ensure geographic coverage has little em-
pirical support. The government could in fact ensure a higher geographic coverage (in the
sense of number of markets with at least one pharmacy) by simultaneously liberalizing entry
and lowering markups. To explore this further, it would be interesting to know the optimal
number of ￿rms and the required policies to ensure this. A complete welfare analysis is not
possible within our empirical framework, but we can address a related question that sheds
partial light on this issue. We ask how the entry restrictions can be liberalized (through ￿)
and the net markup can be reduced (through ￿) in such a way that the total number of
pharmacies in the country remains constant at the current predicted level of 1454. We then
also compute the associated reductions in the absolute gross markups and the number of
markets without any pharmacy.
Table 6 shows the results from this policy experiment. The ￿rst and second columns
show the combinations of entry restrictions and net markups such that the total number of
pharmacies in the country remains constant at the predicted status quo level. To illustrate,
raising the maximum allowed number of pharmacies by 75% (￿ = 1:75) requires a drop
in the net markups by a factor 0:508. In general, as the entry restrictions become more
liberalized (higher ￿), the net markups should drop by more (lower ￿) to keep the total
number of pharmacies in the country constant. With full free entry, we obtain the maximum
drop in net markups by a factor 0:376. To know how these changes translate into absolute
reductions of the regulated gross markups, the third and fourth columns consider the cases
26with no other variable retail costs than wholesale costs (￿ = ￿), and with other variable retail
costs amounting to 10% (￿ = ￿ ￿ 10%). Gross markups can drop by a large amount, even
if there are other variable retail costs. If entry would become fully free, the regulated gross
markups can decrease by between 9:9% and 17:5% in absolute terms without changing the
total number of pharmacies. Finally, in this policy experiment the availability of supply is no
issue. The last column shows that the number of markets without any pharmacy essentially
remains similar to the status quo level of 250.29 These ￿ndings imply that the government
can generate substantial budgetary savings from liberalizing entry without reducing the total
number of pharmacies or inducing problems of geographic availability.
< table 6 >
6 Conclusions
We have studied the role of professional regulation in health care professions. In contrast
to previous research, which has looked at the e⁄ects of minimum standards of competency
(with ambiguous conclusions), we focus on more extreme forms of geographic entry and
conduct regulation, as imposed on pharmacies. We consider both the direct impact of the
regulations on the pharmacies, and the indirect impact on the physicians. We ￿nd that the
geographic entry restrictions have substantially reduced the number of pharmacies, and have
also reduced the number of physicians (since the professions￿entry decisions are strategic
complements). In a more detailed policy analysis we consider liberalizing the entry restric-
tions in combination with lowering the regulated markups, such that the total number of
pharmacies in the country remains constant. We ￿nd that such a liberalization would not
lead to a reduced geographic coverage, in the sense of more markets without any pharmacy,
and would lead to substantial bene￿ts to consumers (tax payers). This evidence strongly
indicates that the current regime of tight entry restrictions and high regulated markups does
not support the public interest.
These ￿ndings are relevant from a policy perspective. In contrast to the U.S. antitrust
authorities, European policy makers have only very recently opened the debate to reform
the liberal professions, and to make their practices more in line with competition policy.
The European Commission recently published a large report by Paterson et al. (2003)
29In principle, when the total number of markets without any pharmacy remains constant, there may still
be large changes in the distribution, i.e. many markets moving from 0 to 1 pharmacy, and many markets
moving from 1 to 0 pharmacy. We found however that such shifts were small in all our policy experiments,
so there is little interest in reporting these results.
27documenting the country-speci￿c regulations of several professions, such as accountants,
engineers, lawyers, pharmacies, and notaries. As another example, the U.K.￿ s O¢ ce of Fair
Trading (2003) published a report on reforming the pharmacies. Our analysis shows how
these policy issues can be addressed by suitably adapting empirical models of free entry
to account for entry restrictions and other relevant factors. In future research it would be
interesting to further extend our analysis to study the role of professional regulation in other
countries and especially in other professions.
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298 Appendix
This Appendix ￿rst characterizes the multiplicity of Nash equilibria outcomes when the
entry decisions of ￿rms of di⁄erent types are strategic complements, and subsequently brie￿ y
presents the parallel case of strategic substitutes.
8.1 Characterization of multiplicity of Nash equilibria
If the entry decisions by ￿rms of di⁄erent types are strategic complements, i.e. Assumption
2(a) holds with strict inequality, then (n1;n2) may show multiplicity with other equilibrium
outcomes of the general form (n1 + m1;n2 + m2). The three Claims below show that the
multiplicity can be characterized in a simple way if Assumptions 1 and 2 are satis￿ed. Taken
together, these Claims imply that the areas of " for which (n1;n2) shows multiplicity with any
other Nash equilibrium outcome are simply given by the areas of overlap with (n1+1;n2+1)
and (n1 ￿ 1;n2 ￿ 1).
De￿ne A(n1;n2) as the set of " for which (n1;n2) is a Nash equilibrium outcome, as given
by the conditions (2) in the text. Furthermore, de￿ne B(n1;n2;m1;m2) as the set of " for
which both (n1;n2) and (n1 +m1;n2 +m2) are a Nash equilibrium, i.e. B(n1;n2;m1;m2) =
A(n1;n2) \ A(n1 + m1;n2 + m2), where m1 and m2 are positive or negative integers.
Claim 1. B(n1;n2;m1;m2) is empty if m1 6= m2. I.e., (n1;n2) may only show multiplicity
with Nash equilibrium outcomes of the form (n1 + m;n2 + m), where m is a positive or a
negative integer.
Proof: Suppose to the contrary that there are also equilibrium outcomes of the form (n1 +
m1;n2 + m2), where m1 6= m2. There are several cases:
(i) If m1 > 0 and m2 < 0, then "1 ￿ ￿1(n1+m1;n2+m2) ￿ ￿1(n1+m1;n2) ￿ ￿1(n1+1;n2),
by the conditions for (n1+m1;n2+m2) to be a Nash equilibrium, by Assumption 2(a)
and by Assumption 1.
(ii) If m1 > 0 and m2 > 0, and m1 > m2, then "1 ￿ ￿1(n1 + m1;n2 + m2) < ￿1(n1 +
m1 ￿ m2;n2) ￿ ￿1(n1 + 1;n2), by the conditions for (n1 + m1;n2 + m2) to be a Nash
equilibrium, by Assumption 2(b), and by Assumption 1.
(iii) If m1 > 0 and m2 > 0, and m1 < m2, then "2 ￿ ￿2(n1 + m1;n2 + m2) < ￿2(n1;n2 +
m2 ￿ m1) ￿ ￿2(n1;n2 + 1), by the conditions for (n1 + m1;n2 + m2) to be a Nash
equilibrium, by Assumption 2(b), and by Assumption 1.
30(iv) If m1 < 0 and m2 > 0, then "2 ￿ ￿2(n1+m1;n2+m2) ￿ ￿2(n1;n2+m2) ￿ ￿2(n1;n2+1),
by the condition for (n1 + m1;n2 + m2) to be Nash, by Assumption 2(a) and by
Assumption 1.
(v) If m1 < 0 and m2 < 0, and m1 > m2, then ￿2(n1;n2) ￿ ￿2(n1;n2 + m2 ￿ m1 + 1) <
￿2(n1+m1;n2+m2+1) < "2, by Assumption 1, by Assumption 2(b), and by condition
for (n1 + m1;n2 + m2) to be Nash.
(vi) If m1 < 0 and m2 < 0, and m1 < m2, then ￿1(n1;n2) ￿ ￿1(n1 + m1 ￿ m2 + 1;n2) <
￿1(n1 + m1 + 1;n2 + m2) < "1, by Assumption 1, by Assumption 2(b), and by the
condition for (n1 + m1;n2 + m2) to be Nash.
In all cases we have obtained a contradiction with the conditions (2) for (n1;n2) to be a
Nash equilibrium outcome.
Claim 2. B(n1;n2;1;1) and B(n1;n2;￿1;￿1) are not empty. I.e., (n1;n2) shows multi-
plicity with (n1 + 1;n2 + 1) and (n1 ￿ 1;n2 ￿ 1).
Proof: The set B(n1;n2;1;1) is given by the conditions (3) in the text. Since we assume
that Assumption 2(a) holds with strict inequality, this set is not empty. A similar reasoning
applies to the set B(n1;n2;￿1;￿1).
Claim 3. B(n1;n2;m;m) ￿ B(n1;n2;1;1) if m > 1, and B(n1;n2;m;m) ￿ B(n1;n2;￿1;￿1)
if m < ￿1. I.e., while (n1;n2) may also show multiplicity with (n1+m;n2+m) for m > 1 or
m < 1, the areas of multiplicity are a subset of those with (n1+1;n2+1) and (n1￿1;n2￿1).
Proof: The set B(n1;n2;m;m) is given by:
￿1(n1 + 1;n2) ￿ "1 ￿ ￿1(n1 + m;n2 + m) (13)
￿2(n1;n2 + 1) ￿ "2 ￿ ￿2(n1 + m;n2 + m);
which may or may not be empty. Since the left-hand-side in (13) is the same as in (3), and
the right hand side in (13) is less than in (3) by Assumption 2(b), we have B(n1;n2;m;m) ￿
B(n1;n2;1;1) if m > 1. A similar reasoning applies to show that the set B(n1;n2;m;m) ￿
B(n1;n2;￿1;￿1) if m < 1.
8.2 Strategic substitutes
The case in which entry decisions by ￿rms of di⁄erent types are strategic substitutes may
be summarized by the following assumption, replacing Assumption 2.
31Assumption 2*. (Entry decisions by ￿rms of di⁄erent types are strategic substitutes or
independent)
(a) ￿1(N1;N2 + 1) ￿ ￿1(N1;N2)
￿2(N1 + 1;N2) ￿ ￿2(N1;N2)
(b) ￿1(N1 + 1;N2 ￿ 1) < ￿1(N1;N2)
￿2(N1 ￿ 1;N2 + 1) < ￿2(N1;N2)
Assumption 2*(a) says that payo⁄s are decreasing or independent of the number of ￿rms
of the other type, so that entry decisions by ￿rms of di⁄erent types are (weak) strategic
substitutes. Assumption 2*(b) says that the extent of strategic substitutes between ￿rms of
di⁄erent types is weaker than that between ￿rms of the same type. Hence, payo⁄s decrease
when there is one more ￿rm of the same type and one less ￿rm of the other type.
As in the case of strategic complements, the market con￿guration (n1;n2) is a Nash equi-
librium outcome if " satis￿es (2). Assumption 1 again guarantees that (n1;n2) is observed
with positive probability. Furthermore, there may again be multiple Nash equilibrium out-
comes (when Assumption 2*(a)). Following a parallel reasoning to the case of strategic
complements, the areas of multiplicity are simply given by the areas of multiplicity with the
Nash equilibrium outcomes (n1 + 1;n2 ￿ 1) and (n1 ￿ 1;n2 + 1). For example, the area of
multiplicity with (n1 + 1;n2 ￿ 1) is given by:
￿1(n1 + 1;n2) ￿ "1 ￿ ￿1(n1 + 1;n2 ￿ 1) (14)
￿2(n1 + 1;n2) ￿ "2 ￿ ￿2(n1;n2);
and similarly for (n1 ￿ 1;n2 + 1).
To obtain a unique equilibrium outcome, we again impose additional structure to the
entry game. We assume that ￿rms enter sequentially, i.e. conditional on observing all pre-
vious entry decisions, and impose the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium re￿nement. In
contrast with the case of strategic complements, the speci￿c ordering of entry matters. In
our application, it is perhaps most natural to assume that type 1 ￿rms (pharmacies) make
their entry decisions before type 2 ￿rms. In this case, an additional pharmacy will enter
and thereby preempt entry of an additional physician, so that the market structure with the
highest number of pharmacies will prevail. As a result, (n1;n2) will be a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium outcome if and only if (i) " satis￿es conditions (2) and (ii) does not satisfy
conditions (14). Assuming that " has a bivariate density f(￿), the probability that the market
32con￿guration (n1;n2) is observed as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is:












when entry restrictions are not binding. When entry restrictions are binding, one can fol-
low the same reasoning as under strategic complements to obtain the same probability of
observing (n1;n2) as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome, given by (6).
33Table 1. Observed market con￿gurations￿
Number of pharmacies Total
0 1 2 3 4 5+
0 142 11 1 0 0 0 154
1 62 36 2 0 0 0 100
Number of 2 27 58 3 0 1 0 89
physicians 3 6 38 16 3 0 0 63
4 8 35 31 4 0 0 78
5+ 1 41 93 95 69 64 363
Total 246 219 146 102 70 64 847
restricted entry 199 179 109 85 61 64 697
% of total 80.9 81.7 74.7 83.3 87.1 100 82.3
￿ Source: RIZIV as discussed in the text.
34Table 2. Summary statistics￿
Variable Description mean std. dev.
# pharmacies Number of pharmacies 1.76 1.81
# physicians Number of physicians 4.93 4.62
ln(population) Logarithm of population 7.91 1.13
% young Fraction of population, 17 years or younger 22.50 2.55
% old Fraction of population, 65 years or older 16.11 2.79
% foreign Fraction of population with foreign nationality 4.27 5.67
% unemployed Unemployment rate 5.61 2.80
Flanders Dummy variable, 1 for the region of Flanders 0.39 0.49
mean income Mean income (in 10,000e) 2.47 0.40
￿ 847 observations (markets in 2001). Source: RIZIV, NIS, Ecodata, and the RSZ as discussed in text.
35Table 3. Estimation results￿
Uncensored bivariate Censored bivariate General model with
ordered probit ordered probit strategic complements
Pharmacies￿payo⁄ equation
constant -19.05 (1.18) -14.09 (3.40) -13.54 (1.82)
ln(population) 2.49 (0.06) 1.95 (0.12) 1.43 (0.13)
% young -0.31 (2.48) 0.73 (9.18) 0.22 (4.26)
% old 10.18 (2.43) 19.00 (5.20) 19.32 (3.54)
% foreign -1.03 (0.94) -0.94 (0.96) -1.00 (1.08)
% unemployed 9.20 (2.22) 22.71 (4.85) 23.06 (4.40)
Flanders -0.03 (0.14) 0.13 (0.34) 0.11 (0.25)
income -0.43 (0.14) -0.35 (0.18) -0.32 (0.19)
￿2
1 2.26 (0.11) 1.50 (0.18) 1.09 (0.23)
￿3
1 3.64 (0.13) 2.56 (0.20) 1.94 (0.30)
￿4
1 4.83 (0.15) 3.14 (0.22) 2.37 (0.35)
￿1
1 ￿ ￿ 0.78 (0.29)
Physicians￿payo⁄ equation
constant -19.41 (0.94) -19.28 (1.12) -17.42 (0.98)
ln(population) 2.54 (0.07) 2.53 (0.08) 2.27 (0.07)
% young 3.45 (2.08) 2.22 (2.25) 2.02 (2.15)
% old 6.85 (1.84) 6.81 (1.90) 5.98 (1.89)
% foreign -3.61 (0.73) -3.58 (0.69) -3.43 (0.72)
% unemployed 2.30 (1.83) 2.29 (1.98) 0.67 (1.89)
Flanders -0.65 (0.12) -0.56 (0.13) -0.58 (0.13)
income 0.32 (0.11) 0.32 (0.12) 0.37 (0.11)
￿2
2 1.30 (0.10) 1.32 (0.10) 1.23 (0.10)
￿3
2 2.34 (0.12) 2.36 (0.12) 2.27 (0.13)
￿4
2 2.99 (0.13) 3.09 (0.13) 2.91 (0.14)
￿1
2 ￿ ￿ 0.16 (0.19)
￿2
2 ￿ ￿ 2.01 (0.29)
￿3
2 ￿ ￿ 3.89 (1.01)
￿4
2 ￿ ￿ 5.99 (0.83)
￿ 0.32 (0.03) 0.05 (0.07) -0.15 (0.09)
Log Likelihood -2,255.6 -1,761.5 -1,740.6
￿ The number of observed markets is 847. Standard errors are in parentheses. The other estimated ￿
j
2
are not shown; constraints on the other ￿
j
1 and ￿k
i are discussed in the text.
36Table 4. Own-type entry e⁄ects￿




1 1.07 (0.14) 1.40 (0.17) 1.40 (0.17)
ETR
3;k
1 1.20 (0.11) 1.32 (0.12) 1.32 (0.12)
ETR
4;k




2 0.86 (0.04) 0.89 (0.05) 1.34 (0.10)
ETR
3;k
2 1.05 (0.04) 1.07 (0.04) 1.22 (0.06)
ETR
4;k
2 0.99 (0.03) 1.00 (0.03) 1.07 (0.04)




i =(j + 1))=(S
j;k
i =j), as given by (11) in
the text. Standard errors are in parentheses.
37Table 5. Summary entry predictions under alternative regulatory policies￿
net markup change
￿ = 1 ￿ = 0:75 ￿ = 0:5
Panel A - no change in entry restrictions (￿ = 1)
number of pharmacies 1454 1363 1191
number of physicians 4201 4175 4125
number of markets without pharmacy 250 252 279
number of markets without physician 142 142 144
Panel B - maximum number of pharmacies doubles (￿ = 2)
number of pharmacies 2074 1840 1488
number of physicians 4232 4207 4152
number of markets without pharmacy 189 202 241
number of markets without physician 144 144 144
Panel C - full free entry in pharmacy market (￿ is large)
number of pharmacies 3035 2493 1836
number of physicians 4489 4394 4261
number of markets without pharmacy 104 139 200
number of markets without physician 108 116 122
￿ ￿ = 1 refers to no change in entry restrictions, ￿ = 2 a doubling in the maximum number of
allowed pharmacies, and ￿ large to full free entry. Similarly, ￿ = 1 refers to no change in the net markups,
￿ = 0:75 to a drop in the net markups by 25% and ￿ = 0:5 to a drop in the net markups by 50%. All
entry predictions are based on the parameter estimates of the general entry model with strategic complements,
last column of Table 3.
38Table 6. Entry restrictions, markups and geographic coverage ￿
keeping the total number of pharmacies constant￿
degree of entry net markup drop absolute gross markup drop number of markets
restriction ￿ by factor ￿ ￿ = ￿ ￿ = ￿ ￿ 10% without pharmacy
1 1 0% 0% 250
1.25 0.719 -7.9% -4.4% 244
1.5 0.576 -11.9% -6.7% 249
1.75 0.508 -13.8% -7.8% 248
2 0.481 -14.5% -8.2% 244
2.25 0.441 -15.6% -8.8% 257
2.5 0.427 -16.0% -9.0% 254
large 0.376 -17.5% -9.9% 252
￿ For each considered ￿ (￿rst column), the relative net markup drop ￿ is computed (second column)
such that the total number of pharmacies remains constant at the predicted status quo level of 1454 . The
third and fourth column show the absolute gross markup drops corresponding to the relative net markup
drop ￿, assuming that retail costs other than wholesale costs amount to respectively 0% (so that ￿ = ￿)
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Figure 1. Nash equilibria with strategic complements
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Figure 2. Nash equilibria ￿strong strategic complementarities
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